In reviewing a trial court’s award of reasonable attorney’s fees for the prevailing party, appellate courts must look to the record to determine if “there is competent substantial evidence which supports the trial court’s order under the totality of the circumstances.” Raza v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 100 So. 3d 121, 126 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). While the amount of fees awarded is subject to a trial court’s discretion, appellate courts still may assess whether trial courts abused that discretion in determining the amount of fees owed to the prevailing party. In some instances, this leads to trial courts being reversed on appeal for awarding significantly less than the amount requested by the party seeking attorney’s fees.
For example, in Biscayne Roofing Co. v. Palmetto Fairway Condo. Ass’n, the Third District Court of Appeal found error in the amount of attorney’s fees awarded by the trial court. In the court below, unrebutted expert testimony called for a fee award between $19,000 and $25,000, but the trial court awarded only $10,000. The appellate court found that the $10,000 award was not supported by the record and constituted an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. The appellate court remanded the fee issue to the trial court for a redetermination of the amount of attorney’s fees owed consistent with its order. 418 So. 2d 1109, 1110-11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
Further, in Autorico, Inc. v. Gov’t Empls. Ins. Co., the Third District Court of Appeal held that the trial court erroneously awarded attorney’s fees based on a contingency fee agreement and not the amount it found reasonable. In the court below, the plaintiff insurer was awarded a judgment against defendant automobile seller for selling a defective automobile to the insured that caught fire after being driven 10 miles. Plaintiff filed a motion to recover its attorney’s fees on the basis that Defendant had asserted frivolous defenses, thereby entitling Plaintiff to its reasonable attorney’s fees. The trial court granted the motion and found that the reasonable attorney’s fees incurred were $2,150.00, but awarded only $833.33 in accordance with the contingency fee contract between Plaintiff and its attorney. The appellate court reversed and held that it was error for the trial court to base the fee award on the contingency fee contract rather than the reasonable amount of fees it had found to be incurred, as the court was not bound by the contingency fee contract in awarding a reasonable fee. The appellate court remanded with directions to enter an attorney’s fee award of $2,150.00. 398 So. 2d 485, 486-88 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).